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Abstract: 
After experiencing nearly 20 years of increases in national recycling rates, the recycling 
rates in some developed countries have leveled off at between 20% and 30% over the 
past decade.   If recycling rates have reached some sort of steady state, then the relevant 
policy question is whether the observed steady state is socially optimal.  Data obtained 
both in the United States and Japan suggest that the net social costs of recycling either 
remain constant (in Japan) or fall with increases in the recycling rate above 8% (in the 
United States).  Policies that serve to increase the recycling rate over existing levels 
would therefore be socially beneficial.  Results also suggest that the net private costs of 
recycling – those costs internalized by municipal governments– also fall with increases in 
the recycling rate for all recycling rates over 25%.  It is not immediately evident, then, 
why municipal governments have not continued to increase their recycling rates and 
reduced their own costs in the process. 
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1. Introduction 
The recycling of household solid waste has become increasingly common across 
the globe over the past 25 years.  The emergence of residential recycling was unlikely the 
consequence of market forces, as rarely was offering curbside recycling services the 
brainchild of some private waste collection firm interested in reducing disposal costs or 
capturing revenue from the recovery and sale of recyclable materials.  Instead, the growth 
can be attributable largely to state and federal government mandates.  The Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act in the United States indirectly resulted in over 82 million 
Americans having access to curbside collection of their recyclable waste (Jenkins at al., 
2008).  The Landfill Directive has made recycling a national priority in many member 
countries of the European Union, and the Law for the Promotion of Sorted Collection and 
Recycling of Containers and Packaging has had a similar impact in Japan.   
 But after steady increases in the recycling rates over much of the 19990’s, the 
percentage of residential waste recycled has remained rather steady over the past 10 
years.  The percentage of residential waste recycled in the United States has grown from 
29.0% in 2000 to just 33.2% in 2008 (U.S. E.P.A., 2008).  The recycling rate in Japan 
was roughly the same in 2007 (20.5%) as it was in 2002 (19.9%).  It appears recycling 
rates have reached some sort of steady state.  The relevant policy question is whether the 
steady state is socially optimal. 
It is not immediately evident why the growth in recycling rates has slowed.  
Although an assortment of other environmental policies have faced increased public 
scrutiny over the past decade, the public rhetoric on recycling remains favorable.  Instead 
of public criticisms, we begin to hear calls for a zero waste society.  Caroline Spelman, 
the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government (a cabinet position within 
the United Kingdom government) has asked each local council to develop a strategy to 
achieve zero residential solid waste.  Scotland has approved a national goal to become the 
world's first zero-waste country by 2025. 
Perhaps the reasons for the steady recycling rates are economic in nature.  
Microeconomic theory might suggest that recovering recyclable materials from the 
residential waste stream, like any other production process, may confront diminishing 
returns to scale and therefore rising marginal costs.  Municipal governments interested in 
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increasing the recycling rate may find the available options too expensive.  And because 
state or federal laws do not require further increases in the recycling rate, many municipal 
governments may have adopted a strategy of sustaining a constant recycling rate.  But if 
the social marginal costs of increasing the recycling rate fall even as private marginal 
costs rise, then municipal decisions may not be efficient. 
This paper examines data available for the United States and Japan to estimate 
both the net private and net social costs of recycling.  The estimated socially optimal 
recycling rate is defined as the rate that minimizes the net social costs of managing 
residential solid waste.  If the optimal recycling rate is estimated to be more/less than the 
current observed recycling rates, then state policy requiring recycling could be 
strengthened/relaxed.  The next section of this paper provides a theoretical context for 
why state and federal governments find it necessary to promote household recycling.  
External costs associated with waste disposal and external benefits associated with 
supplying recycled materials form the core of this argument.  Section 3 then uses data 
available for the United States to estimate the effectiveness of past municipal strategies 
for increasing the recycling rate.  The section provides some understanding for how we 
have achieved current recycle rates and why they might have stalled.  The socially 
optimal recycling rate in the United States and Japan is estimated in Section 4.  Section 5 
concludes the paper with a few policy implications. 
 
2. Asking the Correct Policy Question 
What percentage of solid waste should be recycled?  Is it none?  Is it all?  Or is 
some share in the middle optimal?  The answer is unlikely zero because private firms 
have traditionally found recycling profitable for centuries.  If, for example, the market 
price of scrap aluminum is sufficient to cover the resource costs necessary to disassemble 
old tractor trailers to recover the aluminum siding, then the market will certainly do so.  
The question must then be restated.  How much of the otherwise unwanted waste material 
that, by definition, will cost more to collect and process than is valued by society should 
society recycle?  If the disposal of recyclable materials did not harm the environment or 
generate other external costs or benefits and if markets are sufficiently competitive, then 
the free market internalizes all social benefits and costs of recycling and will find the 
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optimal quantity (Baumol, 1977).  But waste disposal facilities have been estimated to 
generate external costs.  Neighborhood property values decline, climate change gasses 
escape from both landfills and incinerators, and landfills threaten local groundwater 
quality.  Using recyclable materials rather than their virgin counterparts in industrial 
production have also been estimated to reduce air and water pollution.  Recycling 
therefore generates external benefits, and we must therefore abandon the free market 
recycling level and wonder what recycling rate is optimal once the external costs of waste 
disposal and external benefits of recycling are considered. 
Economists have devoted very little attention to answering this question.  Not 
because the question is not a good one, but because, given the nature of the external costs 
of waste disposal and uncertainties in household and municipal costs to recycle, there is a 
better one.  If the costs to the economy to abate solid waste through recycling or other 
means were perfectly known to policymakers, then determining the optimal quantity to 
recycle would not be difficult regardless of the nature of the external costs.  The recycling 
rate should increase until the rising marginal cost of doing so equals the marginal external 
benefit of reducing solid waste.  But the costs to households and firms to collect, process 
and transport materials for recycling can vary widely across regions of the country and 
are largely unknown to policy makers.   
In this case, the better question to ask is not what quantity to recycling but what 
should be the optimal price of waste disposal.  The optimal price should equal to the 
external cost of waste disposal, making the choice of price especially easy if otherwise 
recyclable solid waste is a pollutant whose incremental effect on the environment is 
constant.  Marginal external costs are constant if the first unit of solid waste disposed in a 
landfill is as nasty to the environment as, say, the 100th unit or the 1,000,000th unit.  Each 
unit disposed is damaging, but equally damaging as the others.  The 100th unit of waste 
disposed does not somehow mix with the other 99 units to create some new 
environmental problem.  Toxic or hazardous waste associated with the disposal of 
computers, televisions, and cell phones (such as lead oxide, cadmium, and mercury 
imbedded in these products) are not likely to generate constant external costs.  For toxic 
waste, a threshold can be reached where incremental increases in waste disposal can mix 
with existing waste to form new hazards to human health and the natural environment.   
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The optimal price of waste disposal should therefore equal the social marginal 
cost of waste disposal.  Assuming sufficient competition, market prices for waste disposal 
reflect only the private marginal costs.  The socially optimal price is established by 
assessing a disposal tax equal to the constant external marginal cost of waste disposal.  
Individual households, firms, and municipalities that know their own costs to recycle 
(even if policy makers do not) will recycle until their own marginal cost is equal to the 
after tax price set equal to the social cost of disposal.  By choosing the best price, 
quantities can go where they may, and any resulting quantity will be economically 
efficient.6  Thus a good strategy for reaching efficient levels of solid waste and recycling 
is to set a tax equal to the constant external marginal cost of waste disposal. 
 A related question in the economic literature is where along the waste stream to 
assess the tax.  One option is to assess a curbside per-bag fee paid by households (Porter, 
2002).  Concerns have risen over the likelihood of illegal dumping and the high 
administrative costs of assessing the tax at the curb (Kinnaman, 2006).  The tax could 
instead be assessed at the landfill, thus leaving to the municipality the decision over local 
policy for how best to abate the waste.  A third option is to increase the private cost of 
disposal by subsidizing an alternative such as recycling.  Deposit-refund programs are 
one such example of subsidies paid for recyclable materials (Palmer and Walls, 1997). 
Public policy at the municipal level has evolved within this framework.  Nearly 
all municipalities have avoided mandating recycling quantities from households, perhaps 
due to uncertainties and differences in costs to recycling households.  Instead, many 
municipalities tax waste at the curb by requiring households to purchase special stickers, 
tags, or bags.  Many more municipalities offer free access to curbside or drop-off 
municipal recycling services – in essence subsidizing the household recycling process.  
But policy at the state and national level is often based on setting quantity targets.  In 
response the subtitle D of the Resource and Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA), state 
governments established an assortment of recycling quantity targets.  Thirty-seven states 
in the United States have enacted goals for the recycling rate.  California, New Jersey and 
Oregon have the authority to penalize local governments that do not achieve the recycling 
                                                 
6
 The nature of external costs (constant or rising) is also informing the optimal policy for mitigating climate 
change.  Carbon taxes would be appropriate if external costs are constant, but cap and trade measures ( a 
“quantity” policy) are preferred if carbon dioxide emissions involve rising marginal costs. 
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goal, while Florida cannot penalize but can use grant money as an incentive.  Only 
Arkansas and Virginia have met the recycling goal, while Alabama, Florida, Missouri, 
Pennsylvania and South Carolina are within 5% of achieving their targeted recycling rate 
(Simmons, 2006). Although several states have also levied landfill disposal taxes, these 
taxes are frequently well below the estimated per-ton external marginal cost of waste as 
estimated in the economics literature and discussed below.   
The European Union followed a similar regulatory approach by managing waste 
and recycling quantities rather than establishing optimal prices.  The 1999 Landfill 
Directive requires all member countries of the European Union to reduce waste by 25% 
by 2006, 50% by 2009, and 65% by 2016 from 1995 base levels.  The United Kingdom 
also serves as an interesting case study for the comparison between quantity and price-
based policy.  Britain first attempted to set efficient landfill prices via the use of a landfill 
tax, but soon had to raise the tax to levels well above external costs when it became 
apparent that the existing prices would not reduce waste by levels necessary to satisfy the 
EU landfill directive.  Arbitrary targets seemed to trump efficient pricing.  The Japanese 
government set recycling targets in 1997.  Each municipality in Japan is expected to 
reduce waste generation by 10%, increase the recycling rate from 11% to 24%, and 
reduce waste incineration by 50%.  Each municipality in Japan is required to submit a 
plan to the Ministry of the Environment outlining plans for obtaining these three goals. 
 The repeated theme across much of the developed world is the regulatory reliance 
on mandated quantity measures for waste and recycling rather than setting optimal prices 
as is argued by economic theory.  How have municipalities historically increased their 
recycling rates?  The next section of this paper uses municipal-level data gathered in the 
United States to estimate the recycling rate as a function of household demographic 
variables and municipal policy measures. 
 
3. Municipal Strategies Employed to Increase the Recycling Rate 
Several strategies have been utilized by municipal governments to increase the 
recycling rate.  Municipalities can implement drop-off centers, implement curbside 
recycling, make recycling mandatory, set up a composting program, and charge a per-bag 
fee for household waste collection.  This section summarizes the results of an empirical 
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model (specified in the Appendix) that estimates the recycling rate as a function of these 
policy variables.  The model is estimated using data gathered in the United States as 
described in Folz (1999).   5,044 municipalities that offered solid waste recycling 
services to its households were identified.  Surveys were mailed to a randomly selected 
sample of 2,096 of these municipalities and were returned by 1,021 (a 48.7% response 
rate).  Many of these surveys were incomplete perhaps due to incomplete information on 
the part of the municipal responders resulting in a usable sample of 398 municipalities.   
Several variables that municipal governments have little control over are 
estimated to play a role in determining the recycling rate.  Most important of these is the 
population of the municipality and thus the total amount of solid waste a municipality 
must manage.  Holding all other variables constant, a one percent increase in the total 
quantity of solid waste generated is estimated to decrease the recycling rate by .33%.  
Thus, if a small municipality recycles 20%, then an otherwise identical municipality with 
identical policies but with twice the population will recycle only 14% of its waste.  
Efforts needed to achieve any given level of recycling must therefore be more substantial 
in large cities than in small towns.  Perhaps social norms supporting recycling behavior 
are stronger in small towns than in large cities. 
The demographic composition of citizens in the municipality is also estimated to 
play a role in determining recycling rates.  Tastes for the environment are first among 
these.  The survey asked the municipal respondent to rate (5 options from very weak to 
very strong) the local resident’s level of support for the recycling program.  Twenty 
percent of municipalities rated very strong, another 47% rated “strong” and 26% 
indicated “moderate”.  A one point increase in this assessment of residents’ tastes for 
recycling is estimated to increases the recycling rate by 17.8%.  A municipality with 
“strong” resident support for recycling would therefore experience a 3.5% greater 
recycling rate relative to a base recycling rate of 20%. Controlling for these 
environmental tastes, other demographic differences such as education level, median age, 
percentage of owner occupied residences, household size, ethnic origin, and gender 
played no significant role in determining differences in recycling rates across 
municipalities.  The per-capita income of municipal residents does make a difference – a 
$1,000 increase in per-capita income is estimated to increase the recycling rate by 5.0%. 
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Recycling rates are also a function of policy decisions of the municipal 
government.  Recall that all municipalities in the sample run some type of recycling 
program.  The most basic municipal program could involve developing a non-mandatory 
unstaffed drop-off center for residents to deposit recyclable materials.  Imagine a site in a 
municipal parking lot or near other municipal property with several containers set up to 
receive various categories of recyclable materials.  According to the model, the recycling 
rate increases by 10.4% for each material added.  The average number of materials 
collected for recycling in the sample is 9.23.  The age of this unstaffed drop-off recycling 
program is also estimated to make a difference.  Each year that passes from the 
introduction of drop-off recycling services increases the recycling rate by roughly 1.9%.  
Experience allows residents to become aware of the recycling opportunity, to develop 
strategies to separate, store, and transport materials to this facility, and possibly to adjust 
consumption habits to favor recycling over waste.  A municipality with mean levels of all 
income and demographic variables described above, and managing the median level of 
waste, accepting the median number of materials for recycling, and with nothing but a 
non-mandatory drop-off facility with vintage of 8 years (the mean in the sample) is 
predicted by the model to recycle only 4.98% of its total waste. 
What strategies are available to municipal governments to increase this baseline 
recycling rate?  First, the municipality could staff the drop-off facility.  A staffed drop off 
facility usually increases exposure, reduces the theft of valuable metals, and ensures that 
materials are not corrupted necessitating disposal in a landfill. Such an initiative is 
predicted to increase recycling rate from 4.98% to 6.51%.  If the municipality takes the 
next step and implements curbside recycling, then the recycling rate is estimated to 
increase to 10.67%.  If participation in the recycling program is made mandatory, then 
the recycling rate is estimated to increases again to 14.84% of all waste.  The mandatory 
participation laws are rarely enforced, but may alter social norms in favor of recycling.  
Adding a municipal composting program will increase the recycling rate again to an 
estimated 18.39%. 
Municipal governments having made the decision to adopt curbside recycling 
have a variety of program options from which to choose.  According to the data, most of 
these options do not significantly affect the recycling rate.  For example, municipal 
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governments can (1) collect recyclable materials on the same day as waste collection or 
on a different day, (2) provide recycling containers to households or require households 
to place recyclable materials, and (3) either require households to separate materials into 
separate containers or require collectors to sort through a single mixed recycling 
container to separate materials.  None of these three options is estimated to affects the 
recycling rate.  These options shift the cost of recycling from the household to the 
municipality.  Choosing among these options might therefore be based on who best can 
bear the burden of the costs.  Some municipal governments levy an extra recycling fee 
paid by households for the right to participate in the curbside recycling program.  These 
fees are not estimated to affect the recycling rate – thus they do not appear to discourage 
households from participating in the recycling program.  One program attribute that is 
estimated to affect recycling rates is frequency of collection.  Among municipalities with 
curbside recycling, increasing the number of collections from once per month to once per 
week is estimated to increase the recycling rate from 18.39% to roughly 24.42%.   
One final option available to the municipality is the implementation of a user fee 
for waste collection.  Under this program, each household must pay an added fee for each 
unit of waste presented at the curb for collection.  The implementation of a user fee (of 
unobserved value) is estimated to increase the recycling rate by 21.3% - thereby 
increasing the recycling rate for the median municipality from 24.4% to an estimated 
29.6%.  This is the highest predicted recycling rate available to the municipality with 
median values of income and demographic variables.  Relative to this median 
municipality, the predicted recycling rate could increase for municipalities with smaller 
populations, higher incomes, or citizens with stronger tastes for the environment.   
Recall from above that, other things constant, program maturity is estimated to 
increase the recycling rate by 2% per year.  This estimated is based on differences in 
program maturities observed in 1996, in the midst of a decade when recycling rates were 
increasing this estimated effect of program maturity is not likely applicable today as 
recycling rates have leveled off in recent years.  But if we apply this coefficient, then 
recycling rates are predicted to have grown by 23.9% over the past 14 years.  The 
estimated recycling rate in 2010 for the median municipality would therefore be 36.7% 
rather than 26.9%.  The municipality could also add more materials to the mix of items 
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households can present for recycling – recall that each additional materials increases the 
recycling rate by an average of 10.4%. 
Thus, by setting policy municipal governments have demonstrated partial control 
over their own recycling rates.  The remaining questions are why recycling rates have 
leveled off and what recycling rate is socially optimal.  The next section addresses these 
questions. 
 
4. The Socially Optimal Recycling Rate 
Section 2 made clear that the policy focus across much of the developed world 
relies at least partially upon setting recycling targets.  Yet, nothing is known about what 
rate of recycling is socially optimal.  The optimal recycling rate minimizes the net social 
costs of waste management.  The net social cost of municipal waste management includes 
first the sum of the budgetary costs to the municipality to operate both a municipal solid 
waste collection and disposal program and a municipal recycling program.  These 
programs require labor, trucks, machinery, land, and administrative services.  The 
recycling program could involve curbside collection, drop-off recycling facilities, or 
both.  With either program, recycled materials need to be stored, processed, and 
transported to markets that demand recycled materials.  These budgetary costs to the 
municipality form the private total costs of waste management. 
Any recycling materials generated by the municipal waste program serve as 
inputs to production to a variety of manufacturing industries.  Recycled aluminum, metal, 
paper, glass, and some plastics have economic value.  With sufficient competition, the 
revenue earned on the sale of recycled materials to these industries approximates the 
economic value of providing recycled materials.7  This private benefit of recycling is 
subtracted from the private total cost of waste management to obtain the net private costs 
of waste management. 
The disposal of residential solid waste has been estimated to generate external 
costs and the use of recycled materials over virgin materials in industrial production has 
been estimated to generate external benefits.  External costs of waste disposal are 
                                                 
7
 To the extent that competition is imperfect in markets for recycled materials – the revenues overestimate 
(monopoly) or understate (monopsony) the value of these materials.   
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associated with the nuisance to neighbors of a landfill or incinerator, pollution and 
congestion from garbage trucks, and the emissions of climate gasses.  The economics 
literature has quantified these external costs to be as high as $4.96 per ton for only 
greenhouse emissions and waste transportation externalities (Davies and Doble, 2004), 
$4.39 per ton for only neighborhood nuisances (Defra, 2004), and $8.76 per ton 
(Kinnaman, 2006) and $15 per ton (Porter, 2002) for all external costs.  The external 
costs of incineration have been measured to be as high as $20 per ton (Porter, 2002) and 
$39 per ton (Dijkgraaf, 2008).  Based on this literature, this study will assume the 
external costs are $10 per ton for landfill disposal and $40 per ton for incineration.  These 
per-unit external costs are multiplied by the total quantity of waste landfilled or 
incinerated to derive the external total costs of waste disposal.   
Generating recycled materials allows manufacturing industries to utilize recycled 
materials in production rather than virgin materials.  Craighill and Powell (1996) apply a 
full life-cycle assessment to estimate the external costs associated with each step of both 
the waste disposal and recycling processes.  Even after accounting for the extra efforts 
necessary to collect and process recyclable materials, using those materials for production 
is estimated to reduce both air and water pollution.  These external benefits are estimated 
at $1,771 per ton of aluminum recycled, $189.96 per ton of glass, $228.42 per ton of 
paper, $240.26 per ton of steel, and slightly negative for PET, HDPE, and PVC plastics.  
Multiplying these estimates by the quantity of each material supplied by each municipal 
recycling program allows for the total external benefit of recycling to be calculated.  The 
net social cost of waste management is therefore equal to net private costs of waste 
management plus the external costs of waste disposal less the external benefits of 
providing recycling materials to industry.  The socially optimal recycling rate is that rate 
that minimizes this net social cost of waste management.8 
 
Estimating the Socially Optimal Recycling Rate in the United States 
                                                 
8
 Note that any state subsidies received by municipalities from state governments are not included in the 
analysis since these subsidies reflect transfers from state taxpayers.  These subsidies can be substantial.  
The most common method of funding state programs is solid waste disposal fees/landfill surcharges, 
followed by budget appropriations. 
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The data made available by Folz (1999) are once again useful to calculating the 
net social cost of waste management in the United States.  Although the survey included 
38 questions, only a few are relevant to the net social costs of waste management.  The 
important survey questions included, “What was the total collection and disposal cost for 
all non-recycled municipal solid wastes in 1996?” and “What was the total cost of just the 
city’s recycling program in 1996?”  The survey goes on to ask, “About how much total 
revenue, if any, was obtained from the sale of recycled materials collected in your city in 
1996?”  Subtracting this latter amount from the sum of the first two amounts provide the 
net private costs of waste management.  Another question asked each municipality to 
provide the “Total tons of municipal solid waste disposed or incinerated in 1996?”  The 
amounts provided are multiplied by $10 (for landfill disposal) and $40 (for incineration) 
to estimate the external costs of waste disposal.  Finally, the survey asked municipalities, 
“For the materials in your recycling program, about how many tons of each was collected 
in 1996?”  Respondents indicated tons of aluminum, newspaper, glass, and all types of 
plastics.  These reported quantities are multiplied by the corresponding estimated external 
marginal cost of recycling each material (as reported above) to estimate the overall 
external benefits of recycling.  The sample contains a wide variety of municipalities – the 
minimum population is just 39 persons and the maximum is 8.57 million. The average 
calculated net social cost is just over $5.86 million, but varies widely with a standard 
deviation of $48.8 million. 
The question at hand is estimating which recycling rate minimizes the net social 
costs of waste.  The recycling rate varies in the sample between 1% and 81% with a mean 
of 16.7%.  Increases in the recycling rate could require additional labor and capital, but 
reduces the use of the landfill, provides resources to manufacturers, and the use of those 
resources on net reduces air and water pollution.  If the latter measures exceed the first, 
then the increase in the recycling rate would decrease the net social costs associated with 
managing residential solid waste.  A flexible functional form econometric model is 
utilized to estimate how the net social costs of waste management are affected by changes 
in the recycling rate.  The details of all regressions are described in the Appendix.   
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 Based on the results of the econometric estimation, the best-fit lines associating 
the recycling rate to both the net private and net social costs of managing household are 
provided in Figure 1.  
  
 
 
The estimated best-fit line suggests the net private costs of waste management 
increase with the recycling rate up to a rate of about 25% and then decreases with 
additional increases of the recycling rate.  Rather than facing increasing marginal costs to 
recycle attributable to diminishing marginal returns to recycling inputs, it appears that 
economies to scale are very prominent in residential recycling.  Callan and Thomas 
(2001) and Bohm et al. (2010) also estimate economies to scale in the provision of 
municipal recycling.  Particularly troubling is the observation that the observed steady 
state recycling rate in the United States, at about 28%, is near the top of the estimated net 
private cost curve.  Municipal governments internalize only the private costs and benefits 
of recycling, yet appear to be maximizing their costs.  Municipal (net private) costs could 
decrease by either increasing the recycling rate by taking advantage of economies of 
scale, or decreasing the recycling rate and reducing costs of resources. 
The recycling rate that minimizes the net social costs of recycling is estimated to 
be zero.  The economic value of municipal resources necessary to recycle even a small 
percentage of the waste stream is estimated to exceed the savings in waste disposal 
(private and external) and the value of producing recycled materials (private and 
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external).  According to the graph above, the social cost of recycling 28% of the waste 
stream increase net social costs from about $5.7 million to $6.9 million (for a 
municipality that manages roughly 137,000 tons of waste – the mean in the sample).  If 
the average household of 2.25 persons generates 50 pounds of waste per week, then 
137,000 tons is consistent with a human population of about 237,000 persons.  The 
estimated increase in net social costs of waste management for a variety of municipality 
sizes is listed in the Table below. 
 
 
Persons 
Waste 
(tons) 
TSC at zero 
(millions) 
TSC at 28% 
(millions) 
Increase 
(millions) 
Per-capital 
Increase ($) 
50,000 29,000 $1.34 $1.62 $0.28 $5.60 
237,000 137,000 $5.73 $6.94 $1.21 $5.11 
1,000,000 578,000 $22.04 $26.68 $4.64 $4.64 
5,000,000 2,890,000 $99.36 $120.26 $20.90 $4.18 
10,000,000 5,780,000 $190.03 $230.01 $39.98 $4.00 
 
Thus, a municipal recycling program serving one million persons that achieves a 
recycling rate of 28% increases the social total costs of waste management by roughly 
$4.64 per person per year over the socially optimal recycling rate of zero.  On average, a 
family of four incurs an additional $18.56 in social costs for its municipality to achieve a 
28% recycling rate (the U.S. average).  This amount is certainly not going to break the 
family budget.  Perhaps the take away message from this estimation is that net social 
costs of waste management are rather constant across the recycling rate spectrum. 
But that the estimated net social cost of recycling falls, albeit slightly, with all 
increases in the recycling rates above 10% is an important result.  If society is committed 
to a positive level of municipal recycling, then net social costs can be minimized by 
maximizing the rate of recycling – perhaps to 100%.  If municipal governments do not 
internalize all costs and benefits of waste management, then mandates set at state or 
national levels may be necessary to increase the recycling rate.  This conclusion is 
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especially true for municipalities recycling less than 25% of waste.  These municipalities 
face rising net private costs of increasing the recycling rate even as net social costs 
decrease. 
The regression controls for other variables expected to affect the net social cost of 
waste management.  Most of these variables are not estimated to significantly affect the 
net social cost, but two play a role.  First, the use of curbside recycling rather than the 
establishment of drop-off sites is estimated to increase the net social costs of waste 
management by 39% for any given recycling rate.  Second, every $10 increase in the 
tipping fee, the per-ton cost to dispose waste in a landfill or incinerator, is estimated to 
increase the net social costs by 5.7% for any given recycling rate.  Other economic 
variables such as the wage rate, the interest rate, and the price of fuel had no significant 
effect on net social costs. 
 
Estimating the Socially Optimal Recycling Rate in Japan 
Japan stands out among perhaps every other country in the world in terms of 
making available for public consumption high quality data on residential solid waste and 
recycling.  Beginning in 1979, the Ministry of Environment in Japan organized a 
centralized data gathering process whereby each of the 1,700 Japanese municipalities 
submitted waste management data to its prefecture government (a prefecture government 
is similar to a state government in the U.S.).   Each prefecture compiles and submits the 
municipal data to the Ministry of the Environment, which then makes the data available 
for public consumption.  This hierarchical data gathering process is used in many areas of 
Japanese government including employment, agriculture, manufacturing, and education.  
In recent years the data gathering process has been performed electronically.9  Included in 
the municipal data are quantities of waste generation, recycling, costs of waste 
management and recycling, and a multitude of specific program variables such as the 
number of trucks utilized and salaries paid to waste management workers.  Data on 
market prices of each recyclable material necessary to calculate private benefits of 
recycling were also obtained from the Ministry of the Environment. 
                                                 
9
  For the latest survey result, please see http://www.env.go.jp/recycle/waste_tech/ippan/h20/index.html. 
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Data are obtained for every Japanese municipality over an eight year period 
(2001-2008).  The panel nature of this data allow for the use of econometric methods that 
eliminate potential biases resulting from unobserved municipal variables that may affect 
recycling rates and costs but do not vary across time.  That the data are available for the 
population of Japanese municipalities eliminates any self-selection bias that might occur 
in a sample.  Finally, the Japanese data are more recent than that obtained in the United 
States (1996). 
United States and Japan share much in common in regards to solid waste 
management.  Matsuto and Ham (1990) examine the contents of actual waste generated 
by a sample of households in Madison, Wisconsin and Sapporo, Japan.  The average 
individual in Madison generated 1,016.4 grams of waste per day. Compared to 866 grams 
generated by the average household each day in Sapporo – about 17% more.  The average 
individual in Madison recycled 22% of waste, compared to 21% in Sapporo.  The average 
individual in the Madison generated slightly more paper, metal, and slightly less glass, 
textiles, and food waste when compared to the average individual in Sapporo.  The 
quantity of plastics and bulky waste are estimated to be about equal across the two 
municipalities.  Although disposal patterns are not identical, these data suggest that 
managing waste in these two municipalities share many similarities.  Two differences can 
be identified.  First, population densities are much higher in Japanese municipalities 
relative to U.S. municipalities.  Increasing the recycling rate by adding new households 
may be less costly if collection occurs in densely populated apartment building districts 
rather than sprawling suburban neighborhoods as is more common in the United States.  
Japan is also more likely to use incineration than landfilling. 
The net social costs of managing waste in Japan is calculated, once again, by 
summing the (1) private costs to collect waste, (2) private costs to collect and process 
recycled materials, and (3) the external costs of waste disposal ($10 per ton for land 
disposal or $40 per ton for incineration).  The revenue gained from the sale of recyclable 
materials and the external benefits of supplying recycled materials are then subtracted to 
arrive at the net social costs of waste management.  The relationship between the net 
social cost and the recycling rate was estimated using the same flexible functional form 
model as used above for the United States data.  The estimated best-fit relationship is 
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illustrated below in Figure 2, where the quantity of waste managed, the wage, and the 
number of materials collected is held constant at the same levels as above.  The best-fit 
private net cost curves for the United States are also added to provide perspective for 
comparing costs across the two countries. 
 
 
 
A few differences arise when comparing the estimated best fit lines for Japan with 
those of the Unites States.  Over much of the range of recycling rates, the net private 
costs of managing waste in Japan are less than for the United States.  Perhaps high urban 
population densities in Japan make collecting waste less costly.  Also notice that the 
optimal recycling rate is Japan is not zero.  Increases in the recycling rate are estimated to 
have no statistical effect on the net social costs of waste management – the best fit line is 
essentially flat.10 
Also of interest is the minimal difference between the best fit lines for these two 
countries.  If the statistical relationship between the net social costs of recycling and the 
recycling rate is similar across all developed countries, and if that statistical relationship 
                                                 
10
 The estimated coefficients on the recycling rate and its squared terms had small standard errors, but 
because the coefficient estimates are themselves very close to zero, we are unable to reject the null 
hypothesis of no statistical relationship between the recycling rate and the SNC.  Municipal recycling 
services in Japan are costless in a social sense. 
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suggests that recycling plays very little role in determining net social costs, then global 
recycling efforts have not implication on net social costs.  Nations are free to enact 
recycling regulations as rigid or lax as they wish without demonstrably affecting net 
social costs.  The similarities in the best fit lines also suggest that omitted variables bias 
in the United States data do not significantly affect results.  Recall that the fixed-effects 
econometric models for the Japanese data eliminate bias from unobserved variables that 
are constant across time. 
The Japanese data also allow for the estimation of how recycling each specific 
material affects the net social costs of waste management.  Each municipality in Japan 
reports the quantity recycled of each of six categories of materials (metal, paper, glass, 
PET plastic, other plastics, and other materials).  Holding constant the quantity of other 
materials at their mean levels, Figure 3 illustrates how the net social costs change with 
increases from zero for each of these six specific materials.  The length of each best-fit 
line reflects the observed recycling rates.  No municipality in Japan, for example, 
recycles more that 2% of its overall waste in the form of PET plastic.   
Examining these best fit lines suggests that recycling PET plastic and “other” 
materials increases the net social costs of waste management.  Municipalities or national 
governments interested in reducing social costs could eliminate these materials from the 
waste steam.  But recycling metal (aluminum cans and bi-metal cans comprised mostly of 
steel), glass, paper, and plastic serves to reduce the net social costs of waste management. 
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5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Data obtained both in the United States and Japan suggest that the net social costs 
of recycling either remain constant (in Japan) or fall with increases in the recycling rate 
above 8% (in the United States).  Policies in the United States that serve to increase the 
recycling rate over existing levels would therefore be socially beneficial.  But recycling 
rates in both counties have remained relatively constant or grown only slightly over the 
past decade.  One possible reason could be the rising costs faced my municipal 
governments.  But results here also suggest that the net private costs of recycling – those 
costs internalized by municipal governments– also fall with increases in the recycling rate 
for all recycling rates over 25%.  It is not immediately evident, then, why municipalities 
do not continue to increase their recycling rates and reduce their own costs in the process.   
One possible reason, not considered in this paper, is that costs to recycling 
households may increase with their won recycling levels.  If household costs to prepare, 
separate, and store, materials increase with their own recycling rate, then households may 
rationally choose a recycling rate for less than what might be optimal for a municipal or 
societal perspective.  Municipalities stand ready to accept all materials presented by 
households for recycling, but might be out of policy options to increase recycling 
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quantities.  Enforcing mandatory recycling ordinances might be costly and politically 
offensive.  Sharp increases in curbside taxes necessary to change household behavior 
might encourage illegal dumping of waste.  Offering large recycling subsidies for 
recyclable materials might also be costly. 
State and national governments could play some role in indirectly promoting 
household recycling efforts.  The difference between net social costs and net private costs 
for the median municipality of 237,000 people is estimated to be almost 3 million dollars 
per year both in the United States and Japan (by inspection of Figure 2).  This estimate 
justifies the use of state or federal grants designed to promote household recycling.  If 
instead state and national governments wish to target waste and recycling prices rather 
than their quantities, as is suggested by economic theory, then setting state or national 
waste taxes at roughly $10 (for landfill disposal) and $40 (for incineration) as well as per-
ton subsidies of amounts estimated by Craighill et al. (1995) would alter municipal 
incentives.   
Finally, results here are somewhat supportive of a zero-waste society as defined 
recently in Scotland and other parts of the world.  Although only a few municipalities 
have sustained recycling rates in excess of 50%, the trend line estimated by the full data 
set suggest the net social costs of waste decrease with increases in the recycling rate.  The 
estimated net social costs of recycling 100% of waste in the United States are X – 
compared to Y for zero.  In Japan its Z compared to A. 
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Appendix 
Let yi denote the recycling rate and let zi represent a vector of (k) municipal level 
household demographic characteristics and waste policy variables in municipality i.  
Assume, ln(yi) = a + bkzi + ui, where ui represents unobserved variable that affect the 
recycling rate in municipality i.  Ordinary Least Squares estimates of the parameters a 
and bk are provided in Table 1.  These coefficients are discussed in Section 3 of the 
paper. 
 
Table 1: Determinants of the Recycling Rate (Dependent variable = Ln(Rec Rate)) 
  
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Significance 
CONSTANT 3.773 1.830 5% level 
Ln (Total Waste) 
-0.332 0.082 1% level 
Environmental Tastes 0.186 0.066 1% level 
Percent Female 
-0.005 0.008 - 
Percent White 0.005 0.005 - 
Household Size 
-0.245 0.446 - 
Percent Owner Occupied 
-0.005 0.008 - 
Household Income 0.0000499 0.0000204 5% level 
White Collar Employment 0.006 0.010 - 
Percent College Graduate 
-0.004 0.005 - 
Median Age of Residents 
-0.024 0.016 - 
Age of Recycling Program  0.017 0.010 10% level 
Number of Materials  0.104 .0035 1% level 
Staffed Drop-Off Facility 0.268 0.102 1% level 
Curbside Collection 0.495 0.172 1% level 
Mandatory Participation 0.330 0.089 1% level 
Compost Program 0.214 0.117 1% level 
Curbside Fee for Waste 0.495 0.172 1% level 
Curbside Per-Bag Tax  0.213 0.103 5% level 
N =  398; R2 = 0.484 
 
Next, let yi denote net private costs of waste management, let xi denote the recycling rate, 
and zi represent a vector of k other exogenous variables in municipality i.  A non-linear 
flexible functional form relating yi to xi is given by ln(yi) = a + b1 ln(xi) + b2 [ln(xi]2 + 
gkzi + ui, where ui represents unobserved variable that affect the net private costs in 
municipality i.  Ordinary Least Squares estimates of the parameter are provided in Table 
2.  The same model is applied to the data from Japan.  Fixed-effects estimates of the 
parameters for Japan also appear in Table 2.  These estimated coefficients are used to 
generate the best fit lines illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. 
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Table 2: The Net Private Costs of Recycling (independent variable is LN(PC)) 
 
 United States Japan 
Variable OLS Estimates 
Robust  
Standard Errors 
Fixed Effects 
Estimates 
 
Standard Errors 
LN(recycle rate) 0.446*** 0.106 0.044* 0.024 
[LN(recycle rate)]^2 -0.068*** 0.025 0.006 0.004 
LN(total waste) 0.903*** 0.028 0.450*** 0.020 
Number of Materials 0.013 0.024 0.004*** 0.001 
Ln(wage) 0.841*** 0.297 0.045*** 0.005 
Constant 2.391*** 0.880 10.267*** 0.188 
N = 372; R2 = 0.810  N = 10.275; R
2
 = 0.08 (within), 
0.90 (between), and 0.89 (overall) 
 
Table 3: The Net Social Costs of Recycling (independent variable is LN(SC)) 
 
 United States Japan 
Variable OLS Estimates 
Robust  
Standard Errors 
Fixed Effects 
Estimates 
 
Standard Errors 
LN(recycle rate) 0.226** 0.072 -0.025 0.029 
[LN(recycle rate)]^2 -0.051* 0.020 0.003 0.006 
LN(total waste) 0.936** 0.032 0.420** 0.025 
Number of Materials -0.0003 0.028 0.005** 0.001 
Ln(wage) 0.399 0.331 0.055** 0.007 
Constant 3.647** 0.880 10.623** 0.238 
N = 345; R2 = 0.774  N = 10.260; R
2
 = 0.04 (within), 
0.88 (between), and 0.86 (overall) 
 
The model was then expanded for the Japanese case by eliminating the two “recycling 
rate” variables and adding variables (log and log squared) on each of many recycled 
materials including paper, metal, glass, PET plastic, other plastics, and other materials.  
Because natural logs are used, municipalities with 0 levels of recycling any of the 
materials were dropped from the data.  Results are given in Table 4, and best-fit lines are 
illustrated in Figure 3. 
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Table 3: The Social Total Cost of Recycling in Japan 
(independent variable is LN(STC)) 
 
Variable Fixed Effects Estimate (B) 
Robust  
Standard Errors 
Significance 
Level 
LN(paper recycle rate) -0.081 0.021 1% level 
[LN(paper recycle rate)]^2 -0.001 0.006 - 
LN(metal recycle rate) -0.030 0.020 - 
[LN(metal recycle rate)]^2 -0.045 0.009 1% level 
LN(glass recycle rate) -0.016 0.023 - 
[LN(glass recycle rate)]^2 -0.048 0.012 1% level 
LN(PET recycle rate) 0.141 0.031 1% level 
[LN(PET recycle rate)]^2 0.035 0.009 1% level 
LN(plastic recycle rate) -0.018 0.008 5% level 
[LN(plastic recycle rate)]^2 0.000 0.002 - 
LN(other recycle rate) 0.037 0.006 1% level 
[LN(other recycle rate)]^2 0.004 0.002 5% level 
LN(total waste) 0.386 0.047 1% level 
Number of Materials -0.001 0.002 - 
Ln(wage) 0.090 0.010 1% level 
Constant 11.457 0.456 1% level 
N = 4,736; R2 (within) = 0.122; R2 (between) = 0.866; R2 (overall) = 0.866 
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